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Non technical summary
This paper analyses the link between educational attainment and unemployment
risk in France and Germany, two countries plagued with high unemployment rates.
The aim pursued here is to compare the extent to which various educational out-
comes offer a protection against the unemployment risk. A look at the literature
reveals indeed that the empirical evidence on this topic is extremely scarce - par-
ticularly for France and Germany - and do not lead to conclusive results as to the
empirical link between education and unemployment.
The starting point of the analysis is a broad comparison of the structure of unem-
ployment on the basis of comparable microdata sets, the Emploi survey for France
and the GSOEP for West Germany. Then, the unemployment risk is broken down
into the risk of entering unemployment, on the one hand, and the risk, once unem-
ployed, of not getting reemployed, on the other hand. The impact of educational
attainment on both components is examined. The methodological framework ap-
plied for this analysis is a discrete time competing risks hazard rate model which
makes use of the panel structure of the GSOEP and the Emploi data sets and of
the availability of retrospective monthly data on the employment history of the
respondents in both data sets.
The unemployment rate proves to be higher in France than in West Germany at
all education levels, but particularly for basic vocational and intermediate qualifi-
cations. In both France and West Germany, women face a higher unemployment rate
than men, but the gender unemployment gap is far more pronounced in France. The
higher unemployment rate in France compared to Germany results from a higher risk
of entering unemployment in France whereas the risk, when unemployed, of not get-
ting reemployed is lower there than in Germany. The risk of entering unemployment
is particularly high for French employees with poor education, but higher education
graduates face a lower risk of getting unemployed in France than in Germany.
Concerning the reemployment prospects of the unemployed, they are better in
France than in West-Germany at all education levels, but particularly for the unem-
ployed with a low education level. The effect of education on both risk components
does not differ significantly across genders. Nevertheless, because men and women
differ in their characteristics and in the impact of other variables, their unemploy-
ment risk does differ. In both countries, women face a higher unemployment risk
through the joined effect of a higher risk of entering and of not exiting unemploy-
ment, though the magnitude of the gender gap varies across education levels. The
disadvantage of women regarding the reemployment prospects of the unemployed is
larger in France, especially at lower education levels.
1 Introduction
The level of educational attainment is expected to be a strong determinant of the
employability of individuals in so far as it constitutes an essential part of their
human capital, i.e. of the skills employers can make use of. As previous studies show
(e.g. Lauer, 2003), France and Germany appear to have very different education
systems, in particular with respect to the degree of consideration of employment
prospects, and the distribution of educational qualifications across the population
also differs considerably. At the same time, both countries are confronted with a
similar unemployment problem, the solution of which has invariably been at the
top of the political agenda for the past few decades. The question therefore arises
how the qualifications acquired in the French and German education systems are
rewarded by the respective labour markets in terms of access to employment, or, to
put it differently, what protection they offer against the unemployment risk in both
countries.
Looking at the empirical evidence, it appears that while the link between edu-
cation and wages has been extensively investigated, there is an undoubtable lack of
research on the relationship between education and unemployment. This is particu-
larly true for France and Germany, not to mention comparisons of these countries.
Moreover, the few studies available for other countries do not come to conclusive
results onto the nature of the empirical relationship between education and unem-
ployment. The aim of the present paper is therefore to examine the link between
educational attainment and unemployment risk in a French-German comparison. To
be more specific, a dynamic view is adopted. The unemployment risk is broken down
into the risk of entering unemployment, on the one hand, and the risk of not exiting
unemployment, on the other hand. The impact of educational attainment on both
components is examined on the basis of a discrete-time hazard rate model.
The structure of the paper is the following. First, section 2 looks at the empirical
evidence available so far on the relationship between education and unemployment.
Then, section 3 presents as a starting point a static overview of the link between
education and unemployment in France and Germany. This descriptive analysis is
based on microdata sets which makes it possible to compute the unemployment rate
in a way as similar as possible. The article then moves on to an econometric analysis
of the impact of education on the dynamics of unemployment on the basis of a
hazard rate model. Section 4 proposes a rigorous formulation of the model that will
be estimated. The estimations require an extensive preparation of the microdata,
all the more since the French and the German data sets on which the analysis is
based need to be put in comparable form first. The construction of the spell data
and of the variables used for the analysis is explained in section 5. Finally, section
6 presents the results of the comparative analysis of the impact of education on
the risk of entering unemployment, and section 7 of the analysis of the effect of
education on the hazard of leaving unemployment. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Empirical evidence available so far
While an immense literature is available on the wage structure by education, little
research is devoted to the empirical relationship between education and unemploy-
ment. Among the rare studies, Nickell (1979) examines the impact of education on
unemployment incidence, understood as the probability of being unemployed at a
given time, then analyses the impact of education on the duration of unemployment
based on a simplified version of a hazard rate model. Combining the information
on the impact of education on the duration and on the incidence of unemployment
enables him to derive education-specific probabilities of inflow into unemployment.
The results show for Great-Britain that the level of education strongly influences the
probability of becoming unemployed during working life, but rather weakly affects
the expected duration of unemployment spells.
Jacob Mincer also explored this relationship for men (Mincer, 1991b) as well as
for women (Mincer, 1991a), though with a different methodology. His analysis is
based on the decomposition of the unemployment rate into different components:
the probability of having separated from the previous job, the probability of ex-
periencing unemployment when separated, the duration of unemployment for job
separators and the labour force rate as well as the labour force participation rate
(for women). He then explains the gross unemployment differentials between educa-
tional groups by differences in the various components and finally tries to identify
the impact of education, net of other characteristics, on the components in a term
by term multivariate analysis. He concludes that in the United States, educational
unemployment differentials are far more attributable to the fact that the higher edu-
cation reduces the incidence of unemployment than because it reduces the duration
of unemployment.
More recently, Wolbers (2000) examined the effect of education on the mobility
between employment and unemployment for the case of the Netherlands. The study
applies a single risk discrete hazard rate model to assess on the one hand the im-
pact of the education level on the probability that an employed individual enters
employment, and on the other hand the effect of education on the probability to
exit unemployment and getting re-employed. It appears that less educated have a
greater chance of entering unemployment than the better educated, and they also
have poorer prospects of exiting unemployment. However, the link is not linear. For
instance, university graduates have a greater probability of encountering unemploy-
ment than individuals with higher vocational education, but there are hardly any
differences in the unemployment exit rates of people with secondary and tertiary
education.
Kettunen (1997) explored the link between education and the duration of unem-
ployment on the basis of a Weibull duration model with discrete mixing distribution
for Finland. Education is found to have a strong effect on the duration of unemploy-
ment. Up to a certain level, a higher level of education increases the hazard of exiting
unemployment, but beyond the bachelor’s degree, the re-employment probability de-
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creases again, and unemployed individuals with a master’s or doctor’s degree have
the lowest probability of re-employment.
For France and Germany, however, only a few studies are specifically targeted
at analysing the relationship between education and unemployment. Brauns, Gangl
and Scherer (1999), for instance, analyses the educational stratification of unemploy-
ment in early labour market career and its institutional embodiment by comparing
the situation in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The analysis does not
aim at explaining the dynamics of unemployment but rather consists in estimating
from a static point of view the impact of educational achievement on the unem-
ployment risk in the transition period from education to work. Based on simple
logit estimates, the analysis concludes that Germany is characterised by a fairly
smooth access to initial employment for vocationally qualified graduates, while ex-
tensive job search is confined to the least qualified. Once initial employment has
been found, education plays a negligible role for the risk of unemployment, which
is more tied to the characteristics of the position occupied. In contrast, in France
and the United Kingdom, access to first employment is more difficult and the role
of educational achievement is found to be less pronounced. However, educational
achievement seems to conserve a more important role than in Germany with respect
to securing employment. Joutard and Ruggiero (2000) estimate a structural model
of unemployment duration with a discrete time Weibull specification, in which the
job seekers may anticipate the possible recurrence of unemployment spells. Their
analysis focuses on the role of qualification and gender regarding unemployment
duration. They find out that in France, the highest degree obtained plays an all the
more important role since the occupational position is of high level. Moreover, the
level of education attained turns out to be a more discriminating factor for women
than for men.
The other studies available for France or Germany generally have an other focus
of interest than education. These studies do not refer explicitly to education, but
education generally appears, among others, as an explanatory factor for unemploy-
ment. Most articles examine the duration of unemployment, i.e. the probability of
exiting unemployment rather than the probability of entering unemployment. A gen-
eral analysis of the determinants of unemployment duration is for instance provided
by Wurzel (1993) or Hunt (1999) for Germany and Bonnal and Fouge`re (1990) or
Cases and Lollivier (1994) for France. However, most papers focus on one partic-
ular aspect of unemployment duration. The impact of unemployment benefits, for
instance, has been analysed by Steiner (1997) or Plassmann (2002) for Germany
and by Florens, Ge´rard-Varet and Werquin (1989) or Dormont, Fouge`re and Prieto
(2001) for France. Other studies focus on youth unemployment or the transition
from school to work (e.g. Zimmermann, 2000, Franz and Zimmermann, 2001 for
Germany; Fouge`re, Kramarz and Magnac, 2000, D’Addio, 1998 for France), on the
impact of business cycle (e.g. van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2001) or on more
technical issues like the distinction between state dependence and individual het-
erogeneity (e.g. Steiner, 1997; Magnac, 1998); or the impact of measurement error
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(Magnac and Visser, 1999).
Thus, this paper aims at complementing the empirical literature in three ways.
First, it provides some evidence onto the empirical relationship between educa-
tion and unemployment, which, as has just been observed, is particularly scarce
for France as well as for Germany. Second, it does not only examine the duration of
unemployment, but also entry into unemployment, an aspect which has been par-
ticularly neglected in the literature. Finally, it adopts a comparative perspective,
drawing on the fact that if the gross unemployment rates in France and Germany
are often compared in public discourse, there is to my knowledge no detailed com-
parative study on this subject until now.
3 Stylised facts
3.1 Data and definition of the variables
The data used for the analyses is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) for Germany and from the Emploi survey for France. In both data sets,
the respondents are requested to report their labour market status in each month of
the year preceding the interview month1. This monthly information makes it pos-
sible to retrace the labour market history of the respondents. In the GSOEP, the
individuals are re-interviewed each year since 1984 and leave the sample only be-
cause of attrition, but in the Emploi survey, the retrospective information is only
collected from the 1990 wave onwards. Moreover, because the Emploi survey is a
rotating panel in which one third of the sample is renewed each year, we can track
the employment status of an individual for at most three consecutive years, i.e. for
a maximum of 37 consecutive months. Therefore, the subsequent empirical analyses
will basically rely on the data drawn from the latest three waves available, i.e. 1998,
1999 and 2000, and covers, broadly speaking, the period 1997 to 1999. To illustrate
developments over time, however, the descriptive analysis - which does not need the
longitudinal structure of the data set - will extend to the period between January
1991 and December 1999. The German sample is restricted to West-German resi-
dents. Moreover, the observation samples of both countries only includes nationals
or individuals born in the country and aged between 25 and 55. The age restriction
1 The interview takes place in March every year - except in 1990, where the households were
interviewed in January - and the retrospective information refers to the 12 months immediately
preceding the interview month. Consequently, the data for February 1990 is missing and there
is double information for March, since each wave yields information for March of the previous
year until March of the current year. Because there might be some recall errors (see Magnac
and Visser, 1999), the information of the current year is retained for March in case it does
not coincide with the retrospective information drawn from the next wave. In the GSOEP, the
month of the interview might vary across individuals and across waves, even though the bulk
of the interviews take place at the beginning of the year. The retrospective information on
employment status does not depend on the interview month since it refers to the calendar year
preceding the year of the interview.
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aims to limit the problems related to retirement, on the one hand, and those related
to the fact that too young individuals may not have finished their education yet, on
the other hand.
Table 1: Typology of educational attainment
Highest degree obtained
Level 1 No vocational qualification
10 No degree
11 Lower secondary education
12 Intermediate secondary education
Level 2 Basic vocational qualification
20 No or lower secondary education + basic vocational degree
21 Intermediate secondary education + basic vocational degree
Level 3 Intermediate qualification
30 Intermediate vocational degree
31 Vocational maturity certificate
32 General maturity certificate
33 General maturity certificate + vocational degree
Level 4 Tertiary level qualification
40 Lower tertiary education
41 Upper tertiary education
For the analysis, three labour market states are distinguished: employment, unem-
ployment and non-employment2. For Germany (GSOEP), the monthly employment
state comprises the categories full-time employment, part-time employment, short-
time employment or training at work. For France (Emploi), it comprises permanent
employment, fixed-term employment or training at work. The unemployment state
is based on the declarations of the respondents. In the GSOEP data, the unem-
ployment state refers to unemployment registration at the Federal Labour Office,
whereas in the French data, a respondent may assign himself to unemployment even
if he is not registered as unemployed. Thus, the concept of unemployment differs
somewhat in the French and German data, but this difference is likely to affect the
height of unemployment more than its structure or the impact of education on it,
which is the main outcome of interest in the context of the present analysis. The
non-employment state is the remaining category and includes retirement, maternity
leave, education, military service, housewife and other non-specified states out of
the labour force. The unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of the labour
2 In the Emploi data, the respondents indicate a unique labour force state for each month. This
is not the case in the GSOEP, where individuals may report more than one single labour
market state per month. In case of multiple answers, it was decided to choose which labour
force state applies for one specific month according to the priority: unemployment, employment,
non-employment.
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force (i.e. employed plus unemployed persons) which is unemployed.
Both data sets contain comparable information on completed degrees in general,
vocational and higher education. This information can be combined to define a com-
parable variable for educational attainment based on the highest degree obtained,
such as established in Lauer (2001) and reported in table 1.
3.2 The distribution of unemployment
3.2.1 Structure and developments over time
Figures 1 presents the distribution of unemployment by education for the time period
1997 to 1999 in France and Germany (pooled samples).
Figure 1: Unemployment rate by detailed education level (1997-99)
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Comparing the figures with the official statistics, the unemployment rates re-
ported here appear quite low, especially for Germany. This has also been remarked
by Schmidt (1999), who ran an in-depth analysis of monthly labour market stocks
and flows on the basis of the GSOEP retrospective monthly data. One reason for
the low German figures here is that the sample of observation West German na-
tives, whereas foreigners typically have higher unemployment rates. The same holds
for France. Moreover, the sample only covers individuals aged 25 to 55 and not
the whole labour force. This undoubtedly drives the unemployment rates down for
France, since young people have comparatively higher unemployment rates. A fur-
ther reason lies in the definition of unemployment used here, which includes in the
denominator the self-employed and the military personnel. Finally, the employment
state is self-reported and as such not exempt from reporting errors or recall biases.
The unemployment rate appears to be higher in France than in Germany at all
education levels, but particularly for basic vocational and intermediate qualifications
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(level 2 and 3). Generally speaking, the unemployment rate tends to get lower as the
level of education gets higher. However, the pattern exhibits some non-linearities. In
both countries, the unemployment rate is by far highest for those individuals without
any degree at all (level 10), i.e. neither a school nor a vocational degree. Having at
least a school degree, even below the maturity level, already reduces considerably
the unemployment risk. Having completed basic vocational education (typically an
apprenticeship in Germany) protects further from unemployment in Germany, while
it only slightly reduces the unemployment risk in France. The unemployment rate
is higher in France than in Germany at all education levels, but it seems that the
gap is largest for intermediate qualifications (from level 21 to level 33), while it is
smaller for low and high qualification levels.
Figure 2: Unemployment rate by education level - Germany
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Figures 2 and 3 depict the developments in the unemployment rate by education
level, relying on the one-digit level of the educational scale (see table 1). In both
countries, the developments in the unemployment rate of workers with no vocational
qualification (level 1) differ from the other educational groups. The unemployment
rate of poorly qualified individuals has increased at a faster rate than that of workers
with a least a basic vocational education throughout the 1990s. This divergence
phenomenon was particularly pronounced in Germany until 1997, but then, the
overall decreasing trend in unemployment benefitted more the least qualified so that
the rates converged again. However, since the end of 1998, unemployment progressed
faster for the least qualified again. In France, the increase in the unemployment
rate of the least qualified was regular over the period, whereas it has diminished
slightly and in a quite parallel way for the better qualified groups since 1997. Overall,
university graduates (level 4) face the lowest unemployment rate over the whole
period in France, it is in particular lower than level 3 individuals. In Germany, level
3 qualifications offer a good protection against unemployment, just as good - if not
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Figure 3: Unemployment rate by education level - France
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better - than university education.
3.2.2 Gender differences
Figure 4 and 5 report the average monthly unemployment rate for German and
French men and women in the respective observation samples. As can be seen, women
face a higher unemployment risk than men, but the gender gap is significantly larger
in France than in Germany3. Moreover, the gender gap has remained constant over
the 1990s in France, whereas there seems to be a convergence in the unemployment
rates of German men and women. The time developments differ somewhat in France
and Germany. In Germany, there is a sharp increase in the unemployment rates of
both males and females in the first half of the 1990s. Then, the unemployment went
back for women and stagnated for men. In France, the developments were smoother
over the period: the increase in the unemployment rate was more moderate at the
beginning of the decade, unemployment remained stable in the middle of the decade
and it only decreased slightly at the end of the decade.
Looking at figures 6 and 7, it appears that gender differences are much more
marked in France than in Germany at all education levels. In Germany, however,
men with no degree at all (level 10) are more heavily penalised than women, and
at certain education levels, there is only a small difference (level 11, level 20, level
30 and level 31). The education levels for which women are most disadvantaged
are the Realschule level (with or without a basic vocational education) and the
Fachhochschule level (level 40). In France, women face a higher unemployment risk
than men, whatever their education level. However, here also, the gender gap is
3 Remember from chapter 3 that, by contrast, gender differences in educational attainment - in
favour of men - proved more marked in Germany than in France.
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Figure 4: Unemployment rate by gender - Germany
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99
Month
Pe
rc
en
t
Men Women
Figure 5: Unemployment rate by gender - France
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more or less pronounced depending on the education level. It is lowest at the higher
education level, but also among holders of an advanced vocational qualification (level
30). However, it is particularly large at the basic vocational level (level 2) and below
as well as among holders of the vocational maturity certificates (level 31) or of the
general maturity certificate assorted with some vocational qualification.
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Figure 6: Unemployment rate by detailed education level and gender (1997-99) -
Germany
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Figure 7: Unemployment rate by detailed education level and gender (1997-99) -
France
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4 The modelling framework
The analysis of the stock of unemployed at a given point in time provides a snapshot
of the labour market situation at this point. However, it may be useful to have a look
at the dynamics of unemployment, the flows into and out of unemployment, instead
of just looking at the stock of unemployment. The subsequent microeconometric
analysis aims at examining the way the level of education an individual possesses
affects his probability to enter unemployment, if he has a job, or to exit unemploy-
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ment, if he is unemployed.
The modelling framework chosen for the analysis is a discrete time competing
risks hazard rate model. The basic idea of the hazard rate models (see among others
Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, Lancaster, 1990, Petersen, 1995 and Jenkins, 1995)
is that instead of focussing on the duration spent in a state, one divides this duration
into a certain number of time intervals and looks for each time interval whether the
state the person was in is left or not. Here, it seems a priori adequate to adopt a
so-called competing risks formulation, i.e. to distinguish between different possible
destination states, because the factors influencing the transition into one specific
state might differ from those affecting the transition to another state4. A discrete
time model has been chosen because the data is available in discrete time time in-
tervals (monthly data). Petersen (1995) and Jenkins (1995), among others, propose
a discrete time formulation for single risk models which has the practical advantage
of being estimable in the end as a logit model. For competing risks models, how-
ever, discrete time modelling is extremely seldom. Allison (1982) and more recently
Petersen (1995) postulate that the discrete time competing risks case can be esti-
mated as a multinomial logit model, by extension of the single risk case, but do not
formalise this assumption. Recent studies (e.g. Zimmermann, 2000, Steiner, 2001 or
Reize, 2002) run multinomial logit estimations without, again, formally deriving the
likelihood function corresponding to a multinomial logit model. This paper proposes
a formal presentation of the competing risks model in a discrete time framework and
shows how the relatively simple multinomial logit estimation which has been applied
in the recent literature can be rationalised from an econometrical point of view.
4.1 Formal presentation of the model: basic concepts
Let us assume that T sij describes the time that individual i, i ∈ {1...N}, spent in
the sth, s ∈ {1...Si}, spell of state type j, j ∈ {1...Ω}, before transition to another
state or censoring5 occurs. T sij is a discrete random variable taking positive integer
values6. Now assume that T sij may be partitioned into a discrete number of intervals
It, t ∈ {1...T sij}. If transition or censoring occurs in interval It, then, by definition,
t = T sij. If it has not yet occurred in interval It, i.e. if the individual survives in that
state until the end of interval It, then T
s
ij > t.
The destination-specific hazard rate hsijk is the probability that individual i leaves
his sth spell of state type j for state k, k(6= j) ∈ {1...Ω}, during interval It, given that
the spell j lasted until the beginning of interval It, and given a vector of covariates
4 The hypothesis that the different exit states might be combined will be tested formally (see
sections 6.1 and 7.1).
5 Censoring refers here to right-censoring. It is assumed that the start date of the spell is known.
6 T sij is only observed for individuals who experience state j at least one interval and can therefore
not be zero.
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xijk(t)
7 and some unobserved factors εij
8:
hsijk(t|xijk(t), εij) = Pr(T sij = t, δsijk = 1|T sij ≥ t, xijk(t), εij) (1)
where
δsijk =
{
1 if the sth spell of individual i in state j ends in state k
0 otherwise (spell is censored or ends in another state than k)
In each time interval, only one state may be observed (the original state j or
one of the other k states). Since the different exit states are mutually exclusive, the
overall probability Hsij of ending the sth spell of state type j for any other state
in interval It, conditional on the fact that the spell j lasted until the beginning of
interval It, can be expressed as the sum of the transitions from j to each specific
other state:
Hsij(t|xij(t), εij) = Pr(T sij = t|T sij ≥ t, xij(t), εij) =
Ω∑
k 6=j
hsijk(t|xijk(t), εij) (2)
A contrario, the probability that individual i does not leave his sth spell in state j
in time interval It, conditional on the fact that the spell j lasted until the beginning
of interval It is given by:
1−Hsij(t|xij(t), εij) = Pr(T sij > t|T sij ≥ t, xij(t), εij) (3)
Consequently, the unconditional probability that an individual i who was in his
sth spell of state j remains in this state until the end of interval It (i.e. that he
”survives” interval It) can be expressed by the so-called survivor function S
s
ij:
Ssij(t|xij(t), εij) = Pr(T sij > t|xij(t), εij) =
t∏
z=1
(1−Hsij(z|xij(t), εij)) (4)
Finally, the unconditional probability psijk that individual i leaves his original
state j into state k exactly in interval It can be expressed by the probability that
he survives time interval It−1 and that he leaves state j in interval It, given he had
survived until It−1:
psijk(t|xijk(t), εij) = Pr(T sij = t, k|xijk(t), εij)
= hsijk(t|xijk(t), εij) Ssij(t− 1|xij(t− 1), εij)
= hsijk(t|xijk(t), εij)
t−1∏
z=1
(1−Hsij(z|xij(z), εij)) (5)
Thus, the probability that spell number s of type j is complete and ends in state
k is given by psijk(T
s
ij), and the probability that it is censored is given by S
s
ij(T
s
ij).
7 The vector of explanatory variables may vary according to the origin state j, but also according
to the destination state k.
8 The unobserved individual factors affect the decision to exit the original state for choosing
another state.
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Assuming that all spell observations, conditional on the explanatory variables and
the unobserved factors, are independent and that censoring is random, the sample
likelihood function for the original state j may be written as follows9:
Lj =
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
 Ω∏
k 6=j
psijk(T
s
ij)
δsijk Ssij(T sij))γsij (6)
where δsijk is defined as above and
γsij =
{
1 if the sth spell of individual i in state j is censored
0 otherwise (spell ends in any state k(6= j) ∈ {1...Ω})
Note that:
γsij +
Ω∑
k 6=j
δsijk = 1 (7)
The first term of Lj corresponds to the contribution of the completed spells, the
second term represents the contribution of the censored spells. Using equations (4)
and (5), the likelihood function may be rewritten as:
Lj =
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
 Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(T sij)
T sij−1∏
t=1
(1−Hsij(t))
δ
s
ijk

T sij∏
t=1
(1−Hsij(t)
γ
s
ij
=
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
 Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(T
s
ij)
δsijk T sij−1∏
t=1
(1−Hsij(t))

Ω∑
k 6=j
δsijk
T sij∏
t=1
(1−Hsij(t)
γ
s
ij
=
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(T
s
ij)
δsijk
(1−Hsij(T sij))
Ω∑
k 6=j
δs
ijk
T sij∏
t=1
(1−Hsij)(t)
γ
s
ij+
Ω∑
k 6=j
δsijk
Using equation (7), one obtains:
Lj =
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(T
s
ij)
δsijk
(1−Hsij(T sij))1−γ
s
ij
T sij∏
t=1
(1−Hsij)(t) (8)
This likelihood is too complicated to be maximised directly, but, extending the
method proposed by Jenkins (1995) for binary models to the multinomial case, one
9 The conditioning on xijk(t) and εij has been dropped temporarily to simplify notation.
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can derive an easier estimation method. The trick consists in defining new indicator
variables which depend on the censoring indicators in the following way:
ysijkt =
 1 if δ
s
ijk = 1 and t = T
s
ij
0 otherwise (γsij = 1 or δ
s
ijk = 0 or δ
s
ijk = 1 and t 6= T sij)
zsijt =
 1 if γ
s
ij = 0 and t = T
s
ij
0 otherwise (γsij = 1 or t 6= T sij)
where t ∈ {1...T sij}.
One has:
zsijt =
Ω∑
k 6=j
ysijkt
To put it in words, for people staying in state j in all time intervals observed
(censored observations), ysijkt is zero for all intervals. For people making the transition
to any k, ysijkt is zero for all intervals except the interval of transition (the last one),
when it is equal to 1. zsijt is zero if the spell is censored and if it is not censored, it
is zero for all intervals except the last one when transition occurs.
Using these indicator variables, the likelihood may be rewritten as:
Lj =
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1

T sij∏
t=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(t)
ysijk
(1−Hsij(t))z
s
ij

T sij∏
t=1
(1−Hsij(t))

=
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
T sij∏
t=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
hsijk(t)
ysijk(1−Hsij(t))1−z
s
ij
To put it differently:
Lj =
N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
T sij∏
t=1
hsijk(t)
ysijk(1− Ω∑
k 6=j
hsijk(t))
1−
Ω∑
k 6=j
ysijk
(9)
Thus, after this transformation, the likelihood function boils down to a standard
multinomial likelihood function where the ysijt is the dependent variable and the
censored observations enter the likelihood function as an additional category. In
practical terms, one needs to rearrange the data so that the spell month (if the
month is the time unit for intervals) is the unit of analysis instead of the spell and
construct the indicator variables such as described above. For equation (9) to be
estimable empirically, one needs to operate further choices.
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4.2 Further specification choices
Functional form of the hazard function
The hazard rate is assumed to have a multinomial logit form, with censoring as
the base category:
hsijk(t|xijk(t), εij) =
exp
[
αjk(t) + β
′
jkxijk(t) + εij
]
1 +
Ω∑`
6=j
exp
[
αj`(t) + β
′
j`xij`(t) + εij
] (10)
The multinomial logit form, however, is an adequate specification only if the so-
called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is fulfilled, i.e. if the
odds ratio for a subset of alternatives is independent of the remaining alternatives.
This follows from the initial assumption required for modelling the decision problem
as in (10) that the disturbances are uncorrelated between the states. The validity of
the IIA assumption will be tested by means of two tests: the Hausman test (Hausman
and McFadden, 1984) and the Small Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, 1985). Further
Wald tests (Judge, Hill, Griffiths and Lee, 1985) will be run to test whether some
of the outcome categories should be combined, i.e. whether the parameter estimates
differ significantly across outcome categories.
Functional form of the baseline hazard
In equation (10), αjk(t) is the so-called baseline hazard function, which describes
the pattern of duration dependence, i.e. the way the hazard rate depends on process
time. Here, a semi-parametric specification has been chosen: the baseline hazard
function is assumed to be piecewise constant, i.e. constant within fixed time spans.
This allows for a flexible pattern of duration dependence and avoids misspecification
biases, while it increases efficiency by permitting to aggregate process time units
where the duration effect is found to be constant or the number observations too
small.
Specification of unobserved heterogeneity
It remains to specify the unobserved heterogeneity εij. A common procedure is to
impose a specific distribution on εij, for instance a normal, a log-normal or a gamma
distribution. Heckman and Singer, 1984 have sharply criticised such a parametric
approach, arguing that functional form assumption for unobserved heterogeneity
might seriously affect the parameter estimates, and the economics provide little
guidance for choosing one specific distribution rather than another. For this rea-
son, unobserved heterogeneity will be specified non-parametrically using the mass
point approach. Thus, one assumes a discrete probability distribution for εij, i.e.
one assumes that εij may be partitioned into a limited number M of mass points or
location parameters εmj, m ∈ {1...M}, with a given probability Pr(εmj). The mass
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points and their probabilities have the following properties:
M∑
m=1
Pr(εmj) = 1 (11)
M∑
m=1
Pr(εmj)εmj = 0 (12)
E(εmjxijk(t)) = 0 (13)
Hence, the likelihood function (9) may be rewritten as:
(14)
Lj =
M∑
m=1
Pr(εmj)
 N∏
i=1
Si∏
s=1
Ω∏
k 6=j
T sij∏
t=1
hsijk(t|xijk, εmj)y
s
ijkt (1−Hsij(t|xij, εmj))1−z
s
ijt

The number of mass points is determined by the approach of Baker and Melino
(2000) based on a comparison of information criteria computed from the estimation
results of models with a different number of mass points. The number of mass points
is incremented until the addition of a further mass point stops improving the model,
i.e. stops decreasing the value of the information criteria. The information criteria
have the general form:
IC = lnL∗j − cp (15)
where L∗j is the value of the log-likelihood function obtained after maximisation, p
is the number of parameters estimated and c a penalty function. In order to see
whether the number of mass points found as optimal is robust towards the choice
of the penalty function, three alternative information criteria are used here, with
different functions c as penalty for additional parameters, ICA (Akaike Information
Criterion), ICB (Baysian Information Criterion) and ICH (Hannan-Quinn Informa-
tion Criterion):
For ICA, c = 1 (16)
For ICB, c = ln(O)/2
For ICH , c = ln(ln(O))
where O is the number of observations.
5 Data and variables
In the following analysis, three employment states are distinguished, i.e. Ω = 3.
State 1 corresponds to employment, state 2 corresponds to unemployment and state
3 to non-employment such as defined in section 3.1. The time intervals are of equal
length and consist of months. The analysis concentrates on two aspects: the impact
of education on the hazard hsi12(t) of exiting employment for entering unemployment
(section 6) and the impact of education on the hazard hsi21(t) of exiting unemploy-
ment for employment (section 7).
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5.1 Construction of the spell data
The first step is to construct the appropriate spell data. The data on the employment
history is brought into person-month format and the variables necessary to the
implementation of the model are constructed, in particular the spell identifiers,
the censoring indicators and the hazard rates. Table 2 provides a summary of the
composition of the sample.
Table 2: Sample composition
Spells of: Employment Unemployment
Germany France Germany France
Total sample
Numb. spells 5,579 18,175 2,053 4,888
complete 495 (8.9%) 2,044 (11.3%) 1,541 (75.1%) 2,406 (49.2%)
right-censored 931 (16.7%) 1,964 (10.8%) 286 (13.9%) 974 (19.9%)
left-censored 759 (13.6%) 1,694 (9.3%) 207 (10.1%) 1,117 (24.1%)
left-right censored 3,394 (60.8%) 12,473 (68.6%) 19 (0.93%) 331 (6.8%)
Sample of analysis
Numb. observations 136,948 490,848 15,089 23,112
Numb. spells 4,791 15,734 1,827 3,380
complete 252 (5.3%) 660 (4.2%) 1,541 (84.4%) 2,406 (71.2%)
right-censored 649 (13.6%) 1,944 (12.4%) 286 (15.6%) 974 (28.8%)
left-censored 582 (12.1%) 935 (5.9%)
left-right censored 3,308 (69.0%) 12,195 (77.5%)
Not right-censored spells ending in
employment 1,308 (84.9%) 2,248 (93.4%)
unemployment 342 (41.0%) 1,109 (69.5%)
non-employment 492 (59.0%) 486 (30.5%) 233 (15.1%) 156 (6.6%)
Numb. individuals 4,498 15,000 1,198 2,157
with 1 spell 4,220 (93.8%) 14,303 (95.3%) 812 (67.7%) 1,430 (66.3%)
with 2 spells 263 (5.9%) 660 (4.4%) 245 (20.5%) 416 (19.3%)
with 3 spells 15 (0.3%) 37 (0.3%) 90 (7.5%) 188 (8.7%)
with 4 spells 27 (2.3%) 77 (3.4%)
with 5 spells 11 (0.9%) 35 (1.6%)
with 6 spells 4 (0.3%) 7 (0.3%)
with 7 spells 5 (0.4%) 3 (0.1%)
with 8 spells 3 (0.2%) 1 (0.0%)
with 9 spells 1 (0.1%)
Numb. months 37 37 107 36
For the analysis of entry into unemployment, the focus is on the transition from
employment to unemployment. Therefore, one needs to identify employment spells.
As mentioned previously, the Emploi data is a rotating panel and the individuals are
interviewed only three consecutive years, after which they leave the panel. I select
those individuals interviewed for the first time in 1998 and use the information drawn
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from the two subsequent waves (1999 and 2000) to reconstitute their employment
history over a period of 37 months (from March 1997 to March 2000). In order to
make things comparable, the same restrictions have been adopted for the German
sample, even though a longer panel would be available. Thus, for the German sample,
the employment history is reconstituted over 37 months from December 1996 to
December 1999.
Left-censored spells are problematic to handle. It is common practice to exclude
them from the sample (see among others Steiner, 2001, Reize, 2002), especially when
duration dependence - for which one needs to know the start date of the spell - is to
be examined. This is the option chosen for the analysis of the duration of unemploy-
ment, since the process time, i.e. the time already spent in unemployment at the
month of observation is known to be an essential explanatory factor of the hazard
rate out of unemployment (duration dependence). However, it would be problem-
atic for the analysis of entry into unemployment to exclude left-censored spells, first
because the proportion of left-censored spells is quite large, secondly because keep-
ing only not left-censored employment spells would boil down to selecting a very
specific sample, with a high proportion of labour market entrants or career break-
ers. Therefore, it was decided to keep the left-censored spells in the sample for the
analysis of entry into unemployment. It implies that it is assumed to be no duration
dependence in the hazard rate out of employment (Jenkins, 1995). In the present
context, this should be a minor problem in so far as the focus of the analysis is
not on employment duration dependence and that the censoring status appears as
a control variable in the regression.
Furthermore, the information on employment characteristics is not available from
the monthly calendar data but only from the yearly interviews. This means that
this information is only available if the individual was employed in the month of the
interview. To make it possible to use this information, only those employment spells
extending over the interview month have been retained for the analysis.
For the analysis of the reemployment prospects of the unemployed, one needs to
identify unemployment spells. Because there are much fewer unemployment spells
than employment spells and because the size of the German sample is much smaller
than that of the French sample, it proved not to be feasible to reduce the observation
period of individuals in the German sample to only 37 months like for the analysis
of employment spells, due to an insufficient number of observations at the monthly
level. Therefore, for Germany, the analysis uses information from the waves 1992 to
2000 and thus covers a total of 108 months (From January 1991 to December 1999).
Given the selection procedure and the definition of the samples, the statements
made in the subsequent analyses cannot be considered as applicable for the whole
population in France and Germany, but they give useful insights into the factors
affecting unemployment dynamics and highlight in particular the role played by
education.
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5.2 Explanatory variables
Most explanatory variables are taken from the yearly interviews and have been
merged with the monthly data on employment history. As a rule, the information
drawn from the interview month is assumed to apply for the period extending from
the month after the interview month of the preceding wave until the interview month
of the current wave10. For the information on employment characteristics used for
the analysis of entry into employment, however, the information is assumed to apply
to the employment spell the interview month falls in.
Table 3 provides a synthetic overview of the explanatory variables used and how
they are defined. The education level - the primary variable of interest here - is
defined as in table 1, except that, because of an otherwise insufficient number of
observations at the monthly level, education levels 30 and 31 have been aggregated
into a single category, as well as level 32 and level 33. Further variables have been
included in the regressions to control for observed heterogeneity. The set of explana-
tory variables limits to those variables that can be constructed in a comparable
way for both countries. Most explanatory variables are drawn from the GSOEP and
Emploi data and are self-explaining in the way they are described in table 3. They
will not be further commented here. Some variables, however, deserve additional
explanations.
The information on the regional monthly unemployment rate is drawn from the
online time-series service of the Federal Office for Statistics for Germany and com-
puted on the basis of the Emploi data for France. Tenure is represented by a set of
dummy variables. The information on tenure is drawn from the yearly interview and
therefore applies to the interview month. It has then been incremented by one for
each month pertaining in the employment spell, provided the person has reported in
the subsequent wave to have incurred no job change in that year. The information
on the following wave makes it possible to cross-check this variable. For the anal-
ysis of exit out of unemployment, the baseline hazard, which represents the spell
duration elapsed until the month of the observation, is specified, as explained in
section 4.2, as piecewise constant. Because the number of observations declines as
the elapsed spell duration increases, the month dummies have been aggregated for
longer elapsed durations such as described in table 3.
Finally, an indicator of the income replacement ratio (IRR) is constructed, i.e. the
ratio of the expected unemployment compensation to the expected labour earnings.
The idea is that the higher the unemployment compensation is compared to the
potential earnings to be obtained from working, the lower the probability that the
individual leaves unemployment will be. The IRR is constructed in a similar way for
10 An alternative would be to consider that the information drawn from the interview month
applies partly to a certain period before the interview month, partly to a certain period after
the interview month (e.g. for half of the time extending from the current interview month to
the next one). This approach was not retained because it would have implied that we lose the
first 6 months for France, which is problematic in view of the short overall period of observation
available.
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Table 3: Explanatory variables
Variables Definition
Variables common to both analyses
Education level 6 categories: level 1,level 20, level 21, level 30/31, level 32/33,
level 40, level 41 (see table 1)
Sex 2 categories: female, male
Marital status 2 categories: married, not married
Children<6 Number of children below 6 years of age
Home ownership 2 categories: owner of the house/appartment living in (him-
self or spouse), not owner
Age 6 categories: age 25 to 30, age 31 to 35, age 36 to 40, age 41
to 45, age 46 to 50, age 51 to 55
City size 3 categories: fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, between 20 and
100,000 inhabitants, 100,000 inhabitants or more
Unempl. rate Monthly regional unemployment rate
Current quarter 4 categories: 1st quarter (January to March), 2nd quarter
(April to June), 3rd quarter (July to September), 4th quar-
ter (October to December)
Variables specific to the analysis of entry into unemployment
Tenure 9 categories: <1 year, 1-1.5 years, 1.5-2 years, 2-3 years 3-4
years, 4-7 years, 7-10 years, 10-15 years, ≥15 years
Firm size 6 categories: <5 employees, 5-19 employees, 20-199
employees, 200-1999 employees, ≥2,000 employees, missing
Industry 9 categories: industry (mechanical and electrical engineering,
stone, iron, steel and chemical industry, paper, textile, food
industry, other), agriculture/energy (agriculture, forestry,
fishing, energy, mining), construction, trade (wholesale and
retail), banking (banking, insurance, real estate), transports
(transports and communications), private services (personal
services, eating and drinking, other services to professionals
or private households), public services (welfare services, gov-
ernment, non-profit institutions, other), missing
Prev. employment 3 categories: non-employed, employed, missing
Time trend Month variable
Variables specific to the analysis of unemployment duration
Duration 9 categories: 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 4-6 months, 7-9
months, 10-12 months, 13-15 months, 16-18 months, ≥19 months
Prev. employment 2 categories: non-employed, employed
IRR Predicted ratio of unempl. compensation to labour earnings
Quarter spell begin 4 categories: same as current quarter
Time trend For Germany: 9 year dummies for 1991 to 1999. For France:
month, month squared, month cubed
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both countries. In a first step, a reduced-form wage equation11 has been run on the
basis of the yearly data12, with gender, education, age and age squared, the number
of children below 6 years of age, region, city size and year dummies as explanatory
variables. Then, using the estimation results (see table 10 in the appendix), the
income that could be potentially earned by the unemployed individuals in the sample
of analysis can be predicted (”out-of-sample” prediction)13.
In a second step, the unemployment benefits need to be computed. Unfortu-
nately, the information on the unemployment benefits perceived is not available on
a monthly basis neither in the French nor in the German data. For France, the in-
formation on the perceived unemployment compensation available for the month of
the yearly interview for those unemployed during that month is used. The logarithm
of the unemployment compensation is regressed on gender, education, age and age
squared, number of children below 6, region, city size, year dummies, but also on the
duration of the current unemployment episode, the latter information being given by
the unemployed in the yearly interviews (see estimation results in table 10 in the ap-
pendix). For Germany, there is information on the average monthly unemployment
compensation14 perceived in the previous year for people who were unemployed that
year. This information is matched to the unemployment spells, and the logarithm
of the unemployment compensation is regressed on the basis of this data set on the
same variables as for France, and on the duration of the unemployment spells until
the month observed, which has been constructed from the spell data. Like for wages,
the predicted unemployment benefits is computed. The IRR is then the ratio of the
predicted wage to the predicted unemployment compensation. Table 12 in the annex
provides descriptive statistics for the variables used for the analysis of entry into and
exit out of unemployment, on the basis of the estimation samples.
6 Education and entry into unemployment
6.1 Specification tests
Table 4 presents the results of specification tests with respect to the choice of the
variables to be included in the regression. Due to the extremely long computation
time of the estimation with the mass points (about 5 days), these specification tests
are based on estimations with no modelling of unobserved heterogeneity15.
11 The sample used for the estimation has the same selection criteria (nationality, age, period
considered) as the sample used for the analysis of unemployment spells.
12 The wage earned is not available at the monthly level, neither for Germany nor for France.
13 Since the logarithm of the (monthly gross) wage has been used as a dependent variable, the
prediction is given by exp(βˆ + 1/2σˆ2), where βˆ is the vector of estimated coefficients and σˆ is
the standard error of the estimation (see Greene, 2000, p.69).
14 Defined here as unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) plus unemployment assistance
(Arbeitslosenhilfe).
15 For France, this is no restriction at all, since unobserved individual heterogeneity is found not
to affect significantly the hazard out of employment, see table 5.
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Table 4: Tests on coefficients: χ2 (p> χ2)
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Unempl. Non-empl. Unempl. Non-empl.
Tests on gender interactions
Female * Education 6.57 (0.36) 22.69 (0.00) 4.52 (0.60) 5.71 (0.46)
Female * Married 3.25 (0.07) 31.25 (0.00) 0.60 (0.44) 20.28 (0.00)
Female * Children<6 1.12 (0.29) 79.80 (0.00) 7.91 (0.00) 120.89 (0.00)
Female * Age 4.41 (0.49) 24.06 (0.00) 6.76 (0.24) 15.50 (0.00)
Female * City size 1.06 (0.59) 0.87 (0.65) 1.25 (0.54) 0.85 (0.65)
Female * Unempl. rate 0.05 (0.83) 0.73 (0.39) 0.16 (0.69) 0.16 (0.69)
Tests on specific coefficients (with only significant gender interactions)
Education 18.03 (0.00) 31.77 (0.00) 76.37 (0.00) 18.63 (0.00)
Female 1.28 (0.26) 4.06 (0.04) 9.99 (0.08) 2.74 (0.09)
Tenure 83.76 (0.00) 37.83 (0.00) 59.20 (0.00) 38.05 (0.00)
Firm size 26.68 (0.00) 7.49 (0.19) 106.44 (0.00) 97.11 (0.00)
Industry 15.43 (0.05) 143.49 (0.00) 24.88 (0.00) 5.81 (0.67)
Prev. empl. status 55.83 (0.00) 4.05 (0.04) 237.77 (0.00) 29.41 (0.00)
Married 5.56 (0.06) 42.18 (0.00) 14.31 (0.00) 21.85 (0.00)
Children<6 1.68 (0.43) 0.17 (0.68) 0.03 (0.86) 1.70 (0.19)
Owner 3.51 (0.06) 0.01 (0.91) 15.20 (0.00) 1.10 (0.29)
Age 3.49 (0.62) 20.25 (0.00) 13.12 (0.22) 97.30 (0.00)
City size 5.97 (0.05) 7.18 (0.03) 1.20 (0.55) 3.61 (0.05)
Unemployment rate 5.02 (0.03) 1.44 (0.49) 7.19 (0.01) 4.36 (0.04)
Current quarter 1.68 (0.64) 57.51 (0.00) 90.20 (0.00) 162.50 (0.00)
Month 6.33 (0.01) 5.98 (0.01) 105.80 (0.00) 124.85 (0.00)
Tests on overall significance (finally retained specification)
Overall Wald test 1,366.3 (0.00) 3,825.8 (0.00)
Partial Wald tests 498.5 (0.00) 875.6 (0.00) 2,663.5 (0.00) 1,174.8 (0.00)
A first series of χ2-tests aims at examining whether there are some gender differ-
ences in the impact of certain variables on the hazard rate out of employment into
unemployment and into non-employment16. These tests are based on an estimation
of the model where some (sets of) variables have been interacted with the female
dummy. The interactions which proved not to be significant at the 10 percent level
at least were dropped from the specification. In a second step, the (joint) significance
of the (sets of) variables themselves has been tested, on the basis of a specification
including the significant gender interaction terms. Here again, only the (sets of)
variables significant at the 10 percent level at least have been retained for the fi-
nal specification. Given that the computation time increases exponentially with the
number of parameters to be estimated, it proved particularly desirable to drop the
16 In these tests, the null hypothesis is that the variable(s) considered is (are) not significantly
different from zero. The figure in parentheses gives the probability to which the null hypothesis
can be rejected.
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insignificant variables from the model. The variables included in the equation of the
hazard into unemployment are allowed to differ from those retained for the equation
of the hazard into non-employment. Finally, the overall Wald test tests, on the basis
of the final specification with respect to the variables included, the hypothesis that
all the slope coefficients of both equations are jointly insignificant, which is strongly
rejected. The so-called partial Wald tests run the tests again for each destination
state separately ans also proves to be strongly rejected.
Table 5: Other specification tests
Germany France
Tests for IIA χ2 (p> χ2) χ2 (p> χ2)
Hausman Omitted: unempl. 5.21 (1.00) 1.46 (1.00)
Omitted: non-empl. 7.36 (1.00) 25.76 (1.00)
Small Hsiao Omitted: unempl. 59.61 (0.42) 47.56 (0.65)
Omitted: non-empl. 51.69 (0.71) 47.81 (0.64)
Wald test for combining outcomes χ2 (p> χ2) χ2 (p> χ2)
Comb. unempl. and non-empl. 393.55 (0.00) 732.66 (0.00)
Comb. unempl. and empl. 508.97 (0.00) 2,663.53 (0.00)
Comb. non-empl. and empl. 875.43 (0.00) 1,174.76 (0.00)
Test for number of mass points IC IC
ICA No mass point -5,154.6 -9,228.5
2 mass points -5,154.7 -9,230.5
ICB No mass point -5,582.1 -9,672.1
2 mass points -5,592.0 -9,684.8
ICH No mass point -5,282.6 -9,356.4
2 mass points -5,285.6 -9,361.5
Table 5 presents some further specification tests related to the functional form
assumption. Given the enormous computation time, the tests of the IIA assumption
is run on the model without unobserved heterogeneity. If the alternatives prove
to be independent even without modelling of unobserved heterogeneity, they are
necessarily independent in the less restrictive model where unobserved individual
heterogeneity is controlled for. The tests results show that for both countries, the
IIA assumption is fulfilled, both on the basis of the Hausman tests and on the
basis of the Small Hsiao tests (see the explanation of these tests and on the testing
procedure in section 4.2).
Furthermore, a Wald test examines the hypothesis that some of the alternatives
might be combined or aggregated into a single category, in which case the specifi-
cation should binomial rather than multinomial. In other words, the hypothesis is
tested that the coefficients of two categories do not differ significantly from each
other, for all the possible combinations. As show the results in table 5, the multino-
mial specification seems to be appropriate for France as well as for Germany, since
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none of the categories should be combined.
Finally, the number of mass points describing unobserved individual heterogeneity
has to be determined. Table 5 reports the value of the three information criteria
defined in section 4.2. The preferred model is that yielding the lowest IC value. As
can be seen, all three information criteria lead to the same conclusion. For France like
for Germany, accounting for individual unobserved heterogeneity by distinguishing
two mass points does not improve the fit of the model, which means that the best
model should not include any mass point.
6.2 Estimation results
Table 6 presents the full estimation results of the determinants of the hazard rate
from employment into unemployment and non-employment respectively. The focus
of the analysis is on the impact of education on the risk of entering unemploy-
ment. Therefore, the transition from employment to non-employment will not be
specifically commented upon, but the results are reported in table 6 for the sake
of completeness. The impact of the other variables than education on the risk of
entering unemployment will only be briefly reviewed.
6.2.1 Effect of education
The results in table 6 show that the individuals in the reference group, i.e. individuals
with a poor education level (level 1, no vocational education, see table 1) have
the highest risk of losing their job for entering unemployment, anything else being
constant. Indeed, all the education dummies exhibit a negative sign. This is true in
both France and Germany.
By identical other characteristics, in France, the completion of a higher education
degree seems to particulary protect individuals against the unemployment risk. Vo-
cational degrees do reduce the risk of entering unemployment in France, but not to
the same extent as higher education degrees. In Germany, the best protection against
unemployment seems to be given, all else equal, by vocational qualifications of in-
termediate level (level 3), whereas university graduates face a comparatively higher
unemployment risk. This seems to indicate that the German system of vocational
education performs better than the French one in terms of relative job placement,
while the French system of higher education proves more efficient than the German
one in terms of the relative reduction of the unemployment risk.
At the higher education level, lower tertiary qualifications seem to better protect
against the unemployment risk than upper tertiary qualifications in both countries17
but particularly in Germany. An explanation for this is probably that the lower
tertiary qualifications typically have a practical focus and are more oriented towards
17 A simple χ2-test shows that the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients is rejected at the 1
percent level.
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Table 6: Determinants of hazard rate from employment
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Unempl. Non-empl. Unempl. Non-empl.
coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Education level (ref.: Level 1)
Level 20 -0.35∗ (0.17) -0.06 (0.18) -0.24∗∗(0.08) 0.14 (0.13)
Level 21 -0.46∗∗(0.12) -0.74∗∗(0.00) -0.37∗∗(0.10) -0.13 (0.16)
Level 30 or 31 -0.62∗∗(0.14) -0.01 (0.00) -0.62∗∗(0.14) -0.38† (0.22)
Level 32 or 33 -0.67∗∗(0.17) -0.29∗∗(0.00) -0.55∗∗(0.12) -0.13 (0.19)
Level 40 -0.57∗∗(0.19) -0.68∗ (0.30) -0.80∗∗(0.12) -0.27† (0.16)
Level 41 -0.32∗∗(0.17) -0.50∗ (0.24) -0.73∗∗(0.13) -0.60∗∗(0.19)
Fem. * Level 20 0.07 (0.20)
Fem. * Level 21 0.62∗ (0.31)
Fem. * Level 30 or 31 0.62∗ (0.28)
Fem. * Level 32 or 33 0.64∗∗(0.24)
Fem. * Level 40 0.50 (0.36)
Fem. * Level 41 0.45 (0.37)
Female 0.77∗ (0.38) 0.17∗∗(0.07) 0.36† (0.22)
Tenure (ref.:<1 year)
1-1.5 years -0.17 (0.11) 0.22 (0.10) -0.53∗∗(0.09) -0.25 (0.21)
1.5-2 years -0.16 (0.12) 0.20 (0.11) -0.77∗∗(0.11) -0.98∗∗(0.29)
2-3 years -0.23∗ (0.11) -0.21† (0.13) -0.91∗∗(0.11) -0.66∗∗(0.24)
3-4 years -0.47∗∗(0.13) -0.28† (0.16) -0.91∗∗(0.15) -0.63∗ (0.28)
4-7 years -0.89∗∗(0.22) -0.33∗ (0.17) -1.63∗∗(0.14) -0.61∗∗(0.22)
7-10 years -1.28∗∗(0.27) -0.58∗∗(0.19) -2.03∗∗(0.16) -0.90∗∗(0.23)
10-15 years -1.32∗∗(0.28) -0.48∗∗(0.18) -2.36∗∗(0.18) -1.32∗∗(0.25)
≥15 years -1.67∗∗(0.28) -0.89∗∗(0.22) -3.06∗∗(0.16) -0.93∗∗(0.21)
Firm size (ref.: <5 employees)
5-19 employees 0.49∗∗(0.11) 0.27∗∗(0.10) -0.32† (0.19)
20-199 employees 0.18∗ (0.09) 0.24∗∗(0.10) -0.23 (0.16)
200-1999 employees 0.01 (0.96) 0.18† (0.10) -0.35∗ (0.15)
≥2000 employees -0.32∗ (0.14) -0.05 (0.11) -0.11 (0.14)
Missing 0.42† (0.22) 0.99∗∗(0.10) 1.10∗∗(0.14)
Industry branch (ref.: Industry)
Agriculture, energy -0.36 (0.26) -0.31 (0.21) -0.04 (0.16)
Construction 0.18 (0.12) 0.54∗ (0.24) -0.17 (0.17)
Trade -0.09 (0.11) 0.15 (0.16) 0.09 (0.12)
Banking -0.36∗ (0.15) 0.01 (0.20) 0.13 (0.20)
Transports -0.32† (0.18) 0.45∗ (0.23) -0.35† (0.19)
Private services -0.12 (0.17) 0.70∗∗(0.20) 0.15 (0.11)
Public services -0.29∗∗(0.10) -0.01 (0.14) -0.16 (0.11)
Missing 1.69∗∗(0.00) 1.70∗∗(0.18) -0.82† (0.44)
to be continued...
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...table 6 continued
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Unempl. Non-empl. Unempl. Non-empl.
coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Previous employment status (ref.: Non-employed)
Unemployed 1.19∗∗(0.00) -0.42∗ (0.21) 1.29∗∗(0.08) -1.17∗∗(0.22)
Missing 0.36∗∗(0.00) -0.86∗∗(0.29)
Marital status (ref.: Not married)
Married -0.26† (0.14) -0.50∗∗(0.19) -0.24∗∗(0.06) -0.51∗∗(0.18)
Female * Married 0.28† (0.16) 1.35∗∗(0.24) 1.03∗∗(0.23)
Number of children
Female* Children<6 0.69∗∗(0.08) 0.33∗∗(0.12) 0.98∗∗(0.09)
Home ownership -0.24† (0.13) -0.25∗∗(0.06)
Age (ref.: Age 25-30)
Age 31-35 -0.48† (0.27)
Age 36-40 -0.63∗∗(0.19)
Age 41-45 -0.45∗ (0.14) -0.20 (0.31)
Age 46-50 -0.28 (0.29) -0.27 (0.30)
Age 51-55 0.69∗∗(0.17) 1.56∗∗(0.21)
Female * Age 31-35 0.37∗ (0.18)
Female * Age 36-40 -0.11 (0.22)
Female * Age 41-45 -0.29† (0.19) -0.16 (0.16)
Female * Age 46-50 -0.38† (0.23) -0.48 (0.33)
Female * Age 51-55 -1.32∗∗(0.20) -1.00∗∗(0.33)
City cize (ref.: <20.000 inh.)
20-100,000 inh. -0.32∗ (0.14) -0.03 (0.11)
≥100,000 inh. -0.26† (0.15) -0.28∗ (0.11) -0.19† (0.10)
Unemployment rate
Unempl. rate/10 0.60∗∗(0.27) 0.26∗∗(0.10) 0.32∗ (0.15)
Current quarter (ref.: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter 0.20† (0.12) -0.82∗∗(0.09) -1.55∗∗(0.14)
3rd quarter 0.15 (0.13) -0.43∗∗(0.08) -1.01∗∗(0.13)
4th quarter -0.20 (0.14) -0.26∗∗(0.09) -0.97∗∗(0.15)
Month/10 0.15∗∗(0.06) 0.11∗ (0.06) -0.25∗∗(0.06)
Constant -7.04∗∗(0.44) -6.19∗∗(0.37) 2.98∗ (1.44) 3.88∗∗(1.21)
Number of observations 136,948 490,848
Number of spells 4,791 15,734
Number of individuals 4,498 15,000
Log-likelihood -5,067.6 -9,145.5
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
the needs of the economy, while upper tertiary education also includes subjects like
philosophy or languages that are less demanded by the economy.
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As appears from table 4, where the interactions between the female dummy and
the education variables proved not to be significant, the impact of education on the
risk of entering unemployment does not differ significantly for men and women.
6.2.2 Predicted hazard from employment into unemployment
Using the estimation results, it is possible to predict - taking the right-censoring
issue into account - the hazard rate into unemployment of certain groups of indi-
viduals over the period observed. The predicted hazard rate is computed for people
with average characteristics in their group. Therefore, it results from the estimated
coefficients, on the one hand, but also from the characteristics of the groups.
Figure 8: Predicted hazard rate out of employment into unemployment by education
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As can be seen in figure (8), the least qualified (level 1) have the highest risk
of entering unemployment in both France and Germany. In Germany, individuals
with an advanced vocational qualification (level 3) have the lowest unemployment
risk, whereas in France, higher education graduates do so. Interestingly, the risk of
entering unemployment is higher in France than in Germany at lower qualification
levels, but is lower at higher education levels.
Looking into more detail (figure 9), it appears that in both countries, women
face a higher risk of entering unemployment than men at all education levels18. In
Germany, the gender gap is rather small at lower education levels, while it is highest
among university graduates. In France, the gender gap is more pronounced in poorly
qualified groups, while it is lowest for groups with intermediate qualifications, in
particular for general maturity degree or lower tertiary degree holders (levels 32/33
18 As mentioned above, the gender differences do not result from a different impact of education
on the risk of entering unemployment, but rather from an different impact of gender as such on
the one hand, and from different average characteristics across genders on the other hand.
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Figure 9: Predicted hazard rate out of employment into unemployment by education
and gender
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and 40). The gender gap in favour of men, however, is rather large among French
tertiary level graduates.
Figure 10: Predicted hazard rate out of employment into unemployment
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On the whole, in both countries, the risk is higher for women than for men and
the gender gap has the same order of magnitude (see figure 10). The overall risk of
exiting employment for entering unemployment is higher in France than in Germany.
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6.2.3 Effect of the other variables
In this section, the effect of the control variables is only briefly commented, since
this is not the focus of the analysis. As appears from table 6, the employment
characteristics affect significantly the risk of entering unemployment. Tenure seems
to play a particularly important role for the unemployment risk: the longer tenure
is, the lower the risk of entering unemployment. The effect of tenure seems to be
more pronounced in France than in Germany ceteris paribus. Also firm size play a
significant role, though not so clear-cut than tenure. For both countries, working
in small firms (between 5 and 200 employees) seems to increase the probability of
becoming unemployed compared to very small firms (with less than 5 employees) but
also so compared to larger firms. The industry branch also plays a significant role,
as well as the employment status occupied before the employment spell observed.
Thus, in both countries, people who experienced unemployment before the current
employment spell prove to be more likely to enter unemployment again.
Also the household composition matters. In Germany, being married reduces the
unemployment risk for men, while it increases it for women. In France, being married
reduces the unemployment risk for both men and women, but having children in-
creases the unemployment risk for women only. In both France and Germany, being
owner of the home one is living in reduces the unemployment risk.
Furthermore, the age of the individual proved to have no significant impact on the
risk of entering unemployment, neither in France nor in Germany. City size has only
in Germany a significant effect, the unemployment risk being higher in small towns
there. Besides, in both countries, the higher the regional monthly unemployment
rate is, the higher the personal risk of entering unemployment. Seasonal effects,
as measured by the quarter of observation, can only be identified in France. In
Germany, there is a increasing trend in unemployment risk over the period observed
(1997-1999), while the trend is decreasing in France over the period.
7 Education and exit out of unemployment
7.1 Specification tests
Analogue to the approach followed in section 6.1, the first step consists in deter-
mining an adequate specification. Table 7 reports the results of χ2-tests on the
coefficients of the variables, with a view to determining the variables to be included
in the equations (more details on the tests in section 6.1).
Here again, only the gender interactions significant at the 10 percent level at
least have been kept in the finally retained specification. Then, on the basis of
the equations including the significant interaction terms only, further tests on the
variable coefficients have been run, and here again, only the significant ones at the
10 percent significance level at least have been retained. The variables included are
allowed to differ for the equation of the hazard from unemployment into employment
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Table 7: Tests on coefficients: χ2 (p> χ2)
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Unempl. Non-empl. Unempl. Non-empl.
Tests on gender interactions
Female * Education 5.75 (0.45) 8.34 (0.21) 9.22 (0.17) 10.01 (0.12)
Female * Duration 7.26 (0.40) 10.95 (0.14) 10.19 (0.25) 11.93 (0.15)
Female * Married 5.05 (0.02) 32.93 (0.00) 0.12 (0.73) 1.29 (0.26)
Female * Children<6 4.03 (0.04) 10.19 (0.00) 24.56 (0.00) 4.65 (0.03)
Female * Age 7.11 (0.21) 6.42 (0.27) 8.02 (0.15) 5.07 (0.28)
Female * City size 6.29 (0.04) 1.00 (0.60) 16.44 (0.00) 3.89 (0.15)
Female * Unempl. rate 0.53 (0.47) 1.47 (0.22) 14.74 (0.00) 4.51 (0.03)
Tests on specific coefficients (with only significant gender interactions)
Education 51.83 (0.00) 13.07 (0.36) 13.30 (0.04) 6.44 (0.32)
Female 3.72 (0.05) 0.55 (0.46) 0.76 (0.38) 0.01 (0.92)
Duration 95.28 (0.00) 18.34 (0.02) 166.85 (0.00) 17.47 (0.03)
Previously employed 35.07 (0.00) 7.01 (0.01) 68.89 (0.00) 6.72 (0.01)
Married 8.78 (0.01) 0.17 (0.86) 3.41 (0.18) 2.37 (0.31)
Children<6 0.13 (0.72) 14.67 (0.00) 29.99 (0.00) 15.35 (0.00)
Owner 0.90 (0.34) 5.47 (0.02) 0.82 (0.37) 0.36 (0.55)
Age 54.66 (0.00) 17.71 (0.00) 48.21 (0.00) 16.20 (0.00)
City size 15.80 (0.00) 0.30 (0.86) 26.18 (0.00) 4.74 (0.09)
Unemployment rate 12.79 (0.00) 0.32 (0.57) 0.01 (0.99) 0.50 (0.60)
IRR 11.01 (0.00) 0.06 (0.81) 9.68 (0.00) 0.20 (0.65)
Current quarter 11.70 (0.01) 7.07 (0.07) 63.40 (0.00) 126.80 (0.00)
Quarter of spell begin 3.94 (0.27) 0.29 (0.96) 10.32 (0.02) 5.49 (0.14)
Year 19.54 (0.01) 35.05 (0.00)
Month 141.80 (0.00) 57.61 (0.00)
Tests on overall significance (finally retained specification)
Overall Wald test 641.7 (0.00) 1,231.5 (0.00)
Eq. specific Wald tests 447.5 (0.00) 190.9 (0.00) 915.5 (0.00) 313.9 (0.00)
and for the equation of the hazard into non-employment. The overall Wald test and
the equation specific Wald tests are run on the basis of the final equations in terms
of the variables included and give a measure of the fit of the model.
Table 8 reports the results of further tests aiming at determining the appropriate
functional form. First, for both countries, the multinomial logit specification seems
to be appropriate since the IIA assumption is fulfilled for both countries on the
basis of the Hausman test and on the basis of the Small Hsiao test (see details on
these tests in section 4.2 and in section 6.1). Furthermore, the Wald tests reported in
table 8 show that it is adequate to distinguish between exit into employment and exit
into non-employment and that none of the outcome categories should be combined.
Moreover, all three information criteria (see section 4.2) lead to the conclusion that
the optimal number of mass points is two.
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Table 8: Other specification tests
Germany France
Tests for IIA χ2 (p> χ2) χ2 (p> χ2)
Hausman Omitted: empl. 17.16 (0.97) 22.67 (0.54)
Omitted: non-empl. 2.44 (1.00) -1.37 (-.–)
Small Hsiao Omitted: empl. 43.58 (0.49) 32.84 (0.71)
Omitted: non-empl. 48.96 (0.28) 33.00 (0.70)
Wald test for combining outcomes χ2 (p> χ2) χ2 (p> χ2)
Comb. empl. and non-empl. 352.42 (0.00) 392.64 (0.00)
Comb. empl. and unempl. 447.46 (0.00) 915.50 (0.00)
Comb. non-empl. and unempl. 190.92 (0.00) 313.88 (0.00)
Tests for number of mass points IC IC
ICA No mass point -5,344.6 -7,668.6
2 mass points -5,331.1 -7,696.8
3 mass points -5,333.1 -7.698.8
ICB No mass point -5,619.0 -7,926.1
2 mass points -5,613.1 -7,862.4
3 mass points -5,622.7 -7,872.5
ICH No mass point -5,435.7 -7,752.3
2 mass points -5,424.6 -7,683.1
3 mass points -5,429.2 -7,687.7
7.2 Estimation results
The full estimation results for both countries are reported in table 9. This part of
the analysis focusses on the reemployment probability, i.e. on the transition from
unemployment to employment. The results corresponding to the second possible
outcome (exit from unemployment into non-employment) are nevertheless reported
in the table.
7.2.1 Effect of education
As the estimation results show (table 9), broadly speaking, the higher the education
level is, the higher is the probability to exit unemployment and find a job again,
everything else being equal. Judging from the magnitude of the coefficients, the
education degree seems to have a stronger discriminating power in the chances of
being reemployed in Germany than in France, all else equal.
In France and in Germany alike, tertiary level education is associated with the
best reemployment prospects. In other words, even if advanced vocational qualifi-
cations offer a better protection than higher education against the risk of entering
unemployment in Germany, as we have seen in section 6, once unemployed, they
are not associated with a better reemployment probability. At the higher educa-
tion level, there is only little difference between lower and upper tertiary education
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Table 9: Determinants of hazard rate from unemployment
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Empl. Non-empl. Empl. Non-empl.
coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Education level (ref.: Level 1)
Level 20 0.33∗∗(0.11) 0.15† (0.09)
Level 21 0.57∗∗(0.12) 0.23∗∗(0.11)
Level 30 or 31 0.57∗∗(0.14) 0.35∗∗(0.15)
Level 32 or 33 0.78∗∗(0.17) 0.35∗∗(0.16)
Level 40 0.94∗∗(0.19) 0.42∗∗(0.15)
Level 41 0.90∗∗(0.17) 0.45∗∗(0.16)
Female -0.23† (0.13)
Duration (ref.: 1 month)
2 months 0.08 (0.11) -0.55† (0.30) -0.06 (0.10) -0.17 (0.48)
3 months 0.13 (0.12) -0.35 (0.30) 0.14 (0.15) 0.71† (0.40)
4-6 months -0.04 (0.11) -0.18 (0.24) 0.03 (0.15) 1.07∗∗(0.35)
7-9 months -0.00 (0.13) -0.07 (0.26) -0.12 (0.16) 1.57∗∗(0.36)
10-12 months -0.11 (0.15) 0.26 (0.27) -0.13 (0.17) 1.41∗∗(0.37)
13-15 months -0.11 (0.18) 0.80∗∗(0.28) -0.29† (0.18) 0.61 (0.52)
16-18 months -0.47∗ (0.22) 0.01 (0.41) -0.27† (0.17) 1.53∗∗(0.44)
≥19 months -0.51∗∗(0.17) 0.04 (0.28) -0.35∗ (0.17) 0.61 (0.56)
Previously employed 0.52∗∗(0.10) -0.40∗∗(0.15) 0.74∗∗(0.11) -0.41∗ (0.21)
Marital status (ref.: Not married)
Married 0.27∗∗(0.10)
Female * Married -0.31∗ (0.14) 0.85∗∗(0.16)
Number of children
Children<6 -1.08∗∗(0.42) 0.30∗∗(0.07) -0.80 (0.65)
Female* Children<6 -0.22∗ (0.11) 1.39∗∗(0.44) -0.54∗∗(0.12) 1.37∗ (0.67)
Home ownership 0.35∗ (0.15)
Age (ref.: Age 25-30)
Age 31-35 0.03 (0.09) -0.29† (0.18) -0.26∗∗(0.11) -0.32 (0.23)
Age 36-40 -0.10 (0.11) -0.64∗∗(0.24) -0.25∗ (0.13) -0.84∗∗(0.29)
Age 41-45 -0.09 (0.12) -0.38† (0.24) -0.50∗∗(0.14) -1.48∗∗(0.38)
Age 46-50 -0.57∗∗(0.14) -0.85∗∗(0.30) -0.42∗∗(0.15) -0.17 (0.27)
Age 51-55 -0.92∗∗(0.16) -0.89∗∗(0.27) -1.00∗∗(0.15) -0.81∗ (0.33)
City cize (ref.: <20.000 inh.)
20-100,000 inh. -0.32∗∗(0.12) -0.04 (0.12) -0.57∗ (0.29)
≥100,000 inh. -0.35∗∗(0.11) -0.37∗∗(0.09) -0.36† (0.19)
Female * 20-100,000 inh. 0.28† (0.17) -0.36† (0.20)
Female * ≥100,000 inh. 0.30† (0.16) 0.31∗∗(0.13)
to be continued...
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...table 9 continued
Germany France
Hazard rate into: Empl. Non-empl. Empl. Non-empl.
coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Unemployment rate
Unempl. rate/10 -0.62∗∗(0.19)
Female * Unempl. rate/10 -0.27∗∗(0.09) 0.30∗ (0.14)
IRR -1.39∗∗(0.58) -1.46∗∗(0.52)
Current quarter (ref.: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter -0.18∗ (0.09) -0.35† (0.20) -0.51∗∗(0.08) -3.04∗∗(0.44)
3rd quarter -0.07 (0.09) -0.21 (0.19) -0.39∗∗(0.07) -2.42∗∗(0.32)
4th quarter -0.25∗∗(0.09) 0.07 (0.18) -0.40∗∗(0.07) -1.81∗∗(0.25)
Quarter of spell begin (ref.: 1st quarter)
2nd quarter -0.22∗∗(0.09)
3rd quarter -0.05 (0.08)
4th quarter -0.14† (0.08)
Time trend (ref. G: 1991)
1992 -0.07 (0.22) 1.18∗ (0.55)
1993 -0.42∗ (0.22) 0.61 (0.56)
1994 -0.34 (0.22) 0.19 (0.57)
1995 -0.14 (0.22) 0.92† (0.55)
1996 -0.29 (0.23) 0.21 (0.56)
1997 -0.15 (0.23) -0.11 (0.57)
1998 0.04 (0.23) 0.76 (0.55)
1999 -0.18 (0.24) 0.16 (0.58)
Month -0.22∗∗(0.04) -0.82∗∗(0.22)
Month squared/10 0.15∗∗(0.02) 0.49∗∗(0.11)
Month cubed/100 -0.03∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗(0.02)
Constant -2.31∗∗(0.50) -4.54∗∗(0.58) -1.09∗ (0.47) -0.61 (1.39)
Mass points
ε1 1.21∗∗(0.14) 1.73∗∗(0.10)
ε2 -0.52 -0.58
Pr(ε1) 0.30∗∗(0.08) 0.25∗∗(0.04)
Pr(ε2) 0.71 0.75
Number of observations 15,089 23,112
Number of spells 1,827 3,380
Number of individuals 1,198 2,157
Log-likelihood -5,257.1 -7,530.8
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
in terms of reemployment probability after an episode of unemployment, all else
constant.
Like for entry into unemployment, the education level is not found to exert a
different impact for men and women on the exit out of unemployment into employ-
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ment.
7.2.2 Predicted hazard from unemployment into employment
The hazard rate out of unemployment and into employment can be predicted for
subgroups of individuals on the basis of the estimated coefficients and of group-
specific characteristics means, taking right-censoring into account. One hazard rate
is computed for each of the identified heterogeneity groups and the overall haz-
ard rate is calculated as the sum of the heterogeneity group specific hazard rates,
weighted by the estimated probabilities of belonging to the respective heterogeneity
group. Because the period of observation is longer in the German sample, due to
an otherwise insufficient number of observations (see section 5.1), the hazard rates
for the German sample are computed for a maximum unemployment duration of 36
months, like for the French sample.
Figure 11: Predicted hazard rate out of unemployment into employment by educa-
tion (over a max. of 36 months of unemployment)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
lev.1 lev.20 lev.21 lev.30/31 lev.32/33 lev.40 lev.41
Education level
H
az
ar
d 
ra
te
Germany France
As can be seen from figure 11, at all education levels, the hazard of exiting un-
employment for employment is higher in France than in Germany. The gap between
France and Germany, however, seems somewhat more pronounced at lower qualifi-
cation levels (until education level 2).
On the whole (see figure 12), once unemployed, the reemployment probability
is higher in France than in Germany. This is particularly true for men. In both
countries, the reemployment prospects of unemployed men are better than those of
unemployed women, but the gender gap is significantly stronger in France.
Looking at gender differences by education level (figure 13), it appears that at
all education levels and in both countries, men have significantly higher chances
34
Figure 12: Predicted hazard rate out of unemployment into employment (over a
max. of 36 months of unemployment)
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Figure 13: Predicted hazard rate out of unemployment into employment by educa-
tion and gender(over a max. of 36 months of unemployment)
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of being reemployed than women after an episode of unemployment. The gender
gap in favour of men is far more marked in France at lower qualification levels (no
or basic vocational degree, level 1 and 2), rather similar for both countries at the
intermediate education level (level 3), but again more pronounced in France among
tertiary level graduates (level 4).
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7.2.3 Effect of the other variables
The effect of the other variables can be read from table 9. As mentioned previously,
the optimal number of mass points amounts to two for both countries. This means
that the French and the German samples can be divided into two heterogeneity
groups respectively. The first group has, for some unobserved reason, an above av-
erage probability of exiting unemployment (positive mass point), while the second
group has a slightly below average propensity to leave unemployment. In both coun-
tries, the probability of belonging to the former group is significantly lower than that
of belonging to the latter group.
In both countries, the reemployment rate seems to decline with unemployment
duration, i.e. there is a negative duration dependence, even if unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity is controlled for. However, this negative impact of unemployment
duration only turns significant for unemployment periods longer than 15 months
in Germany and longer than 12 months for France, so, broadly speaking, for the
long-term unemployed.
In France and in Germany alike, individuals who were employed immediately
before their current episode of unemployment prove to have a higher probability of
reemployment compared to those who inactive before their current unemployment
spell.
The composition of the household matters also for exit from unemployment. In
Germany, being married is associated with higher chances of finding employment
again, while it reduces the reemployment prospects of women. Having young chil-
dren further reduces the probability of exiting unemployment for employment for
Germany women. In France, the marital status does not have a significant impact
as such on the reemployment probability of men and women, but the presence of
young children does: it increases the reemployment probability of men, whereas it
reduces that of women. Being the owner of the apartment or house one is living in
proves to exert no significant impact.
Though the age has been found not to affect significantly the risk of entering
unemployment, it does play a role for the reemployment probability of unemploy-
ment individuals. Broadly speaking, the older unemployed have lower chances of
getting employed again. In Germany, this effect is only significant for unemployed
aged above 45, who have a significant lower probability of finding a job again than
the reference group of people aged between 25 and 30. This reemployment rate is
particularly low among the age group 51-55, everything else being constant. In the
French sample, all the age dummies prove negative and significant in statistical
terms. Unemployed individuals aged between 31 and 40 have a significantly lower
reemployment probability than the age group 25-30, but a higher one than indi-
viduals older than 40. Like for Germany, the age group 51-55 also faces the lowest
reemployment probability in France.
The effect of city size is significant and differs across genders in both countries:
living in a large city is associated with a lower reemployment probability for men,
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but a higher one for women. The higher the unemployment in the region is, the lower
the chances of exiting unemployment. In France, this effect only concerns women.
As expected, the Income Replacement Ratio (IRR) such as approximated here (see
definition discussion in section 5.2) proves to have a significant negative effect on the
reemployment probability in both countries. Finally, the estimation results reported
in table 9 point to some seasonal effects as well as time trend.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between educational attainment and unem-
ployment risk for two countries, France and Germany, which are plagued with high
unemployment rates. Thus, the objective is to compare the extent to which various
educational outcomes offer a protection against the unemployment risk. A look at
the literature reveals that the empirical evidence on this topic is extremely scarce -
particularly for France and Germany - and do not lead to conclusive results as to
the empirical link between education and unemployment. The econometric analysis
conducted in this paper aims at filling this gap in research. The starting point of
the analysis is a broad comparison of the structure of unemployment on the basis
of comparable microdata sets, the Emploi survey for France and the GSOEP for
Germany. The unemployment rate proves to be higher in France than in Germany
at all education levels, but particularly for basic vocational and intermediate qual-
ifications. In both France and Germany, women face a higher unemployment rate
than men, but the gender unemployment gap is far more pronounced in France.
The econometric analysis focusses on the risk for the employed to enter unemploy-
ment, on the one hand, and on the risk for the unemployed not to get reemployed,
on the other hand. The impact of educational attainment on both components is
examined. The methodological framework applied for this analysis is a discrete time
competing risks hazard rate model which makes use of the panel structure of the
GSOEP and the Emploi data sets and of the availability of retrospective monthly
data on the employment history available in both data sets.
The estimations lead to the following results. Broadly speaking, the higher the
education level is, the lower the risk of entering unemployment is and the better
are the reemployment prospects once unemployed. However, this does not apply
at all levels and in the same way for both countries. In both countries, individu-
als with a poor level of education face, ceteris paribus, the highest risk of losing
their job and entering unemployment, but also the poorest reemployment prospects
when unemployed. In Germany, however, the best protection against the risk of
entering unemployment is given, all else equal, by vocational qualifications of inter-
mediate levels, whereas university graduates face a higher unemployment risk. Once
unemployed, however, German university graduates have better chances of getting
reemployed than graduates of intermediate vocational qualifications. In France, ter-
tiary level education offers, like in Germany, the best protection against the risk of
not exiting unemployment, but also against the risk of entering unemployment. As
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a result, the risk of entering unemployment is higher in France than in Germany at
lower qualification levels, but lower at higher education levels. The reemployment
prospects of the unemployed are better in France than in Germany at all education
levels, but particularly at lower qualification levels.
The impact of education on both the risk of entering and the risk of not leaving
unemployment turns out not to differ significantly for men and women, all else
equal. Thus, it seems that the educational degrees of men and women are valued
in the same way by the labour market in terms of unemployment risk. However,
because men and women have different characteristics, both within and between
educational groups, and because the effect of other variables varies across genders,
the unemployment risk does differ across genders. In France and in Germany alike,
women face at all education levels both a higher risk of entering unemployment and
a higher risk of not finding reemployment than men when unemployed, though the
magnitude of the gender gap varies across education levels.
On the whole, the risk of entering unemployment is higher in France than in
Germany, but once unemployed, the risk of not finding reemployment is higher in
Germany. In both countries, women face a higher unemployment risk than men,
through the joined effect of a higher risk of entering unemployment and a higher
risk of not finding reemployment once unemployed. The gender gap has the same
order of magnitude for both countries as far as the risk of entering unemployment
is concerned, but French unemployed women seem to have a greater comparative
disadvantage in finding a new job than their German counterparts, so that the
gender gap is higher in France regarding reemployment prospects.
To conclude this paper, the results seem to indicate that the unemployment prob-
lem in Germany lies to a greater extent than in France in a comparatively high
persistence of unemployment, while the French unemployment problem rather lies
in a greater lack of job security compared to Germany, particulary at lower qualifi-
cation levels. Furthermore, the results point to a comparatively better performance
of the German system of vocational education in ensuring job stability, while the
French system of higher education offers a better relative protection against the risk
of entering unemployment. This might be one the reasons why people strive more
for access to higher education in France, while a larger proportion of German people
aims at completing vocational qualification.
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Appendix
Figure 14: Unemployment rate by education for men - Germany
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Figure 15: Unemployment rate by education for women - Germany
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99
Month
Pe
rc
en
t
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
42
Figure 16: Unemployment rate by education for men - France
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Figure 17: Unemployment rate by education for women - France
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Table 10: Regression results: wage equation
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Education level (ref.: Level 10)
Level 12 0.26∗∗ (0.02) 0.27∗∗ (0.01)
Level 20 0.18∗∗ (0.01) 0.18∗∗ (0.00)
Level 21 0.24∗∗ (0.01) 0.31∗∗ (0.00)
Level 30 0.40∗∗ (0.01) 0.42∗∗ (0.01)
Level 31 0.32∗∗ (0.02) 0.41∗∗ (0.01)
Level 32 -0.16∗∗ (0.02) 0.46∗∗ (0.01)
Level 33 0.32∗∗ (0.01) 0.41∗∗ (0.01)
Level 40 0.53∗∗ (0.01) 0.61∗∗ (0.00)
Level 41 0.63∗∗ (0.01) 0.77∗∗ (0.00)
Female -0.56∗∗ (0.00) -0.40∗∗ (0.00)
Age
Age/10 0.23∗∗ (0.03) 0.58∗∗ (0.01)
Age squared/100 0.02∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗ (0.01)
Children<6 -0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
City cize (ref.: <20.000 inh.)
20-100,000 inh. 0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
≥100,000 inh. 0.10∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗ (0.00)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Constant 6.98∗∗ (0.06) 7.68∗∗ (0.03)
Observations 53,486 151,839
R2 0.32 0.33
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 11: Regression results: unemployment compensation equation
Germany France
Variable coef. (s.e) coef. (s.e)
Education level (ref.: Level 10)
female -0.38∗∗ (0.01) -0.18∗∗ (0.01)
Level 12 0.12∗∗ (0.02) 0.13∗∗ (0.02)
Level 20 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.09∗∗ (0.02)
Level 21 0.16∗∗ (0.01) 0.17∗∗ (0.02)
Level 30 0.18∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗ (0.06)
Level 31 0.26∗∗ (0.02) 0.20∗∗ (0.03)
Level 32 0.01 (0.05) 0.26∗∗ (0.03)
Level 33 -0.04 (0.02) 0.28∗∗ (0.06)
Level 40 0.27∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗ (0.02)
Level 41 0.21∗∗ (0.02) 0.45∗∗ (0.03)
Female -0.38∗∗ (0.01) -0.18∗∗ (0.01)
Age
Age/10 0.27∗∗ (0.05) 0.21∗∗ (0.06)
Age squared/100 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Children<6 -0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗ (0.01)
City cize (ref.: <20.000 inh.)
20-100,000 inh. 0.02† (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
≥100,000 inh. 0.04∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Unemployment duration (ref.: G:<12 months, F:1 month)
2 months 0.17∗∗ (0.02)
3-5 months 0.34∗∗ (0.02)
6-11 months 0.33∗∗ (0.02)
12-17 months 0.00 (0.01) 0.28∗∗ (0.02)
18-23 months -0.07∗∗ (0.02) 0.18∗∗ (0.03)
24-35 months -0.20∗∗ (0.02) 0.12∗∗ (0.02)
≥36 months -0.44∗∗ (0.02) -0.10∗∗ (0.02)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Constant 6.46∗∗ (0.09) 8.24∗∗ (0.12)
Observations 11,083 11,604
R2 0.25 0.15
Significance level : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics (estimation samples, %)
Spells of: Employment Unemployment
Germany France Germany France
Education level Level 1 11.1 30.6 25.4 45.8
Level 20 27.9 21.8 32.8 19.5
Level 21 18.0 12.1 15.0 10.3
Level 30 or 31 16.1 6.7 9.3 4.9
Level 32 or 33 8.0 6.2 4.6 6.8
Level 40 6.6 11.9 3.4 7.3
Level 41 12.4 10.6 9.5 5.4
Sex Male 56.8 54.1 49.4 40.2
Female 43.2 45.9 50.6 59.8
Duration 1 month 11.9 14.6
2 months 10.0 11.7
3 months 8.5 9.8
4-6 months 18.8 21.1
7-9 months 13.0 14.2
10-12 months 9.2 10.3
13-15 months 6.2 6.2
16-18 months 4.5 4.3
≥19 months 18.1 7.7
Tenure <1 year 8.1 1.4
1-1.5 years 6.1 3.7
1.5-2 years 5.5 3.5
2-3 years 8.7 7.8
3-4 years 6.2 4.4
4-7 years 16.3 11.5
7-10 years 14.4 12.1
10-15 years 12.5 13.3
≥15 years 22.0 38.9
Missing 0.3 0.0
Firm size <5 employees 13.4 29.1
5-19 employees 16.2 10.0
20-199 employees 25.2 14.0
200-1999 employees 21.2 19.9
≥2000 employees 23.8 22.7
Missing 0.9 4.3
to be continued...
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...table 12 continued
Spells of: Employment Unemployment
Germany France Germany France
Industry branch Industry 31.6 17.6
Agriculture, energy 3.0 8.2
Construction 5.7 5.8
Trade 12.7 11.9
Banking 9.0 4.3
Transports 5.4 4.4
Private services 3.4 16.3
Public services 27.9 31.3
Missing 1.10 0.2
Previous empl. status Employed 77.0 82.8
Unemployed 4.6 5.2
Non-employed 6.2 1.7 23.0 17.2
Left-censored 89.2 93.1
Marital status Married 69.6 68.9 54.3 49.3
Not married 30.4 31.1 45.7 51.7
Children<6 0 child 81.4 82.6 79.7 81.5
1 child 13.9 13.7 14.7 15.3
2 child 4.4 3.5 5.0 2.9
3 child 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3
4 child 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Home ownership Owner 48.7 70.0 25.9 47.5
Not owner 51.3 30.0 74.1 52.5
Age Age 25-30 19.0 11.3 27.7 22.0
Age 31-35 21.1 14.4 21.2 19.1
Age 36-40 19.2 18.0 16.2 16.8
Age 41-45 16.4 20.1 11.8 16.4
Age 46-50 14.4 20.5 11.2 12.8
Age 51-55 9.9 15.7 11.9 12.9
City size <20.000 inh. 43.6 49.8 41.8 0.44
20-100,000 inh. 27.6 11.9 24.5 14.8
≥100,000 inh. 28.8 38.2 33.7 41.0
Unemployment rate* 9.3 11.7 9.1 12.6
(2.1) (3.0) (2.4) (3.3)
IRR* 33.9 44.8
(7.2) (9.5)
Current quarter 1st quarter 21.7 27.8 24.6 30.3
2nd quarter 26.3 24.4 23.4 20.0
3rd quarter 26.2 24.1 25.0 22.9
4th quarter 25.8 23.7 26.6 26.9
to be continued...
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...table 12 continued
Spells of: Employment Unemployment
Germany France Germany France
Quarter of spell begin 1st quarter 21.4 18.9
2nd quarter 12.4 33.0
3rd quarter 14.4 24.3
4th quarter 51.7 23.9
Year 1991 2.2
1992 5.3
1993 9.5
1994 12.7
1995 12.8
1996 11.7 14.5
1997 11.5 16.2 11.0
1998 12.9 40.5 14.1 33.4
1999 12.5 47.7 12.7 43.2
2000 11.8 12.0
*For metric variables, the figure in parentheses refers to the standard error.
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